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Why Ireland: How Bank Failure Was Their 
Key To Success
Nia R. Gillenwater
Scripps College
Abstract
Despite Ireland’s status as the first European Union (EU) country to receive a bailout, 
Ireland appears to be bouncing back extremely well from the ongoing financial crisis in 
Europe and the EU. Looking at recent Irish economic statistics it begs the question whether 
the government’s complete guarantee of all Irish debts was the best response. Ireland’s fi-
nancial crisis seemed quite similar to America’s: for both the root causes are freely lending 
for real estate and property. The responses however, were very different. While America 
let Lehman Brothers fail and only provided a partial guarantee to its banks, Ireland provided 
a complete guarantee to all debt-holders. Yet as of late, Ireland’s unemployment rate has 
fallen below the EU average, the growth rate of the economy in 2015 was a surprising 5.2% 
and may be the fastest growing economy in the EU at the moment. Using an analysis of 
the Irish government’s response to the crisis this paper investigates why Ireland’s complete 
guarantee, without traditional Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funds, became the 
best move for the country.
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Across the board the 2008 Financial Crisis was rooted in the United States’ sub-
prime mortgage fiasco, but each country, and region of the world, was affected differ-
ently depending on its own financial conditions. Some countries (like Germany) used 
the excess of credit to continue to invest in American banks and mortgages, white others 
(like Greece) used the easy access to credit to hide their lack of tax revenue despite their 
enormous public sector. Ireland however, mimicked the United States (US). Ireland grew 
its construction and property sector. Irish property developers received loans to develop 
more and more Irish land while Irish people received easy mortgages to buy homes and 
condos. Unfortunately, there were not enough people to buy all the homes that the 
property developers built and as those loans collapsed, unemployment rose drastically and 
as unemployment rose people drastically people are unable to make their mortgage pay-
ments and those loans become nonperforming as well.
As Irish banks were the main holders of the property loans and mortgages their bal-
ance sheets turned from high performing in the long term to full of losses both short and 
long term. Each country needed to develop its own recovery plan because of the unique 
characteristics of each country’s banking landscape, financial sector and government. 
Ireland benefitted from the banks being the root of their crisis being banking errors, it set 
them up for an easier recovery than a number of other countries.
IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde explains Ireland’s successful recovery 
from the crisis through “clarity of purpose, financial and fiscal focus, ownership by the 
Irish authorities and resilience to stay the course” (Coakley, 2015 p.2). Ireland’s successful 
recovery cannot be denied at this point, they had 5% growth in 2014. Growth was lead 
by strong exports, from recovered businesses starting production again; and investment, 
from recovered trust in the banks and financial system (Coakley, 2015). However, she 
disregards that Ireland used this time to rebuild their banking and financial sector to safe-
guard small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and homeowners.
Ireland’s immediate response to the collapse of their banking and financial sec-
tor was a complete guarantee of their banks. One of Ireland’s next actions was to create 
the Nation Asset Management Agency (NAMA). NAMA’s purpose was to “purchase 
the large property loans at ‘long-term economic value’, thereby crystallizing prospective 
losses” (Honohan, 2012 p.3). This meant that NAMA ate some of the bad loans (loans 
above €20 million) on an Irish banks balance sheet- banks were able to sell nonperform-
ing loans, at a discount, to NAMA. Selling the nonperforming loans meant that a loss 
appeared on the banks balance sheet immediately rather than waiting for the loan holder 
to default and forcing banks to go through the messy arrears or foreclosure process.
Banks took advantage of this opportunity in droves; banks transferred (sold) €74 
billion worth of loans at a discount of 57%. Banks were able to remove nonperform-
ing loans from their balance sheets and still receive 43% of the value of the loan, instead 
of potentially 0% had they kept the loan on their books. This protected the banks from 
any further deterioration of the Irish property market. A sure 43% of a nonperform-
ing loan guaranteed at least partial repayment. The banks avoided further exposure; if 
property values continued to fall the banking system would not be subject to those losses 
(Schoenmaker, 2015).
The benefit of NAMA is that it removes uncertainty on repayment and allowed 
banks to fully recognize losses earlier than they would without it (Schoenmaker, 2015). 
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Uncertainty is the bane of financial institutions existence. This differs from risk because 
with uncertainty the outcome is unknown. Risk refers to the known probability of 
a negative outcome rather than a positive outcome; risk is how banks make money. 
Uncertainty however, refers to the unknown probability of a negative outcome. Risk 
can be planned and compensated for, risky assets have higher rates of return. Uncertainty 
however eliminates activity in financial markets; credit will be impossible to receive. No 
one wants to interact with an institution full of uncertainty. 
Allowing banks to fully recognize losses meant that banks could have a more realis-
tic idea of how much capital they would need to weather the storm. As every institution 
worldwide was suffering from liquidity issues, having a realistic idea of how much excess 
liquidity a bank would need to keep it open makes regulatory institutions happy and 
more likely to grant liquidity for a bank. It also protects a bank from facing further losses 
as described above. NAMA’s ability to remove uncertainty and allow banks to solidify 
losses early on was instrumental to Ireland’s success. 
NAMA also had some freedom to dispose of its assets according to the market. 
NAMA was provided overall targets to act within but it was not beholden to time 
requirements for reselling its assets to gain back some value. This was a successful 
approach because it allowed flexibility, for example because London’s market recovered 
first NAMA was able to dispose of those assets first while waiting for Ireland’s market to 
recover and then dispose of those assets later (Schoenmaker, 2015). The flexibility afford-
ed to NAMA added to the success of NAMA as an asset management agency. NAMA’s 
ability to eat bad loans at a discount was crucial to Ireland’s banking system’s recovery; 
eliminating uncertainty and fully realizing losses at an early stage was vital. All things 
considered, NAMA is an example of a successful bad asset management agency and was 
crucial, especially in conjunction to the restructuring of Irish banks made possible by the 
restructuring of Irish banks, to Ireland’s ability to recover (Schoenmaker, 2015).
Ireland’s blanket guarantee of banks’ liabilities was in response to a fear of contagion 
(Eichengreen, 2015). Watching Lehman Brothers fall in America and the havoc it caused 
worldwide made all governments concerned about the fallout of not providing their 
financial institutions necessary capital. Lehman Brothers had worldwide consequences and 
it was unclear what other banks would have similar effects. Additionally, receiving such a 
high level of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) would put a dent in Irish confidence 
(Eichengreen, 2015). ELA is an immediate payout that would put Ireland’s ability to pay 
into question. Typically a country providing ELA can simply print the money necessary 
to provide their banks with the required excess liquidity. While it can create inflation-
ary pressures, the collapse of a major bank is usually seen as more dangerous. However, 
because EU countries are not in control of printing of currency, ELA is more onerous 
to provide. Ireland cannot simply print money to handle the sudden demand that ELA 
would present. ELA in the EU is also a very bureaucratic process; it requires unanimous 
approval from the Board of Governors. ELA also does not allow Ireland to set specific 
guidelines in the way that a guarantee, backed by solely the Irish government, does. 
While a guarantee is a long-term payment scheme, it allows Ireland to restructure banks 
as necessary. It also provides a lot of confidence for the banking sector.
While ELA should provide the same amount of confidence in the banks and bank-
ing sector that a government guarantee does, the rise of systemically important banks has 
Why Ireland
2 0 Nia R. Gillenwater Scripps College
shifted ELA to actually remove confidence in a bank. ELA has been increasingly viewed 
as a lifeline for insolvent banks, instead of its intent as a stopgap for illiquid banks. This 
trend worked in favor for Ireland, because a guarantee of its debts showed the Irish peo-
ple, and the markets, that the government of Ireland was willing to stand behind its bank-
ing sector rather than asking the EU for help. Because guaranteeing bank debts didn’t 
explicitly involve ECB funds, it did not require an EU vote. Bypassing the EU bureau-
cracy saved time, effort and political capital. The guarantee and subsequent recapitaliza-
tion had the added bonus of keeping Irish banks open to receiving ELA in the future if 
they needed to.
Ireland provided a total of €79.8 billion in recapitalization (€64 billion from the 
government, €15.5 billion from exchanges on subordinated debt and private equity) to 
the following Irish banks: Bank of Ireland (BOI), Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Anglo Irish 
Bank (Anglo), Anglo Irish Nationwide Banking Society (INBS), Educational Building 
Society (EBS) and Irish Life and Permanent (ILP) (Schoenmaker, 2015). Recapitalization, 
on its face, was provided through the Irish Government; while the European Financial 
Stability Facility did provide the funds, they were given to the Irish Government for dis-
persal (Schoenmaker 11). The dollar amount of recapitalization is high, no doubt, but it 
provided the Irish government with a lot of leverage to restructure the banks and banking 
sector as it saw fit.
Through nationalization, mergers and restructuring Ireland created a two-pillar 
banking system, with two broad banks (BOI and AIB) with €80 to 90 billion in loans 
and a smaller bank (permanent TSB) with only €30 billion in total loans (Schoenmaker, 
2015). They accomplished this through to following rearrangements: nationalizing 
Anglo in January 2009 and INBS in August 2010 (Schoenmaker, 2015). Anglo depos-
its were moved to AIB, INBS deposits moved to ILP and Anglo and INBS were then 
merged into Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) (Schoenmaker, 2015). ILP was 
split, the insurance aspect (Irish Life) was sold on by the government and the banking 
aspect received state aid and was renamed permanent TSB (PTSB). EBS received state 
aid and underwent a massive restructuring. Upon completion it was merged into AIB 
(Schoenmaker, 2015). In sum, AIB absorbed a number of smaller banks (Anglo and EBS), 
BOI received massive state aid, IBRC was merged/created and PTSB was created. IBRC 
was never really able to get a handle on its finances and was liquidated in 2013. So effec-
tively, you move from six banks into a concentrated system with two big banks (AIB and 
BOI) and one small bank (PTSB) (Schoenmaker, 2015).
The benefits to creating such a small banking system may not last forever, but with 
so much happening in the European system having a consolidated system can make 
communication and regulation much easier. It does suffer from a lack of competition, 
that may drive up the prices of loans and other services but Ireland built in safeguards to 
ensure the two major banks could not shut the Irish government out of its business. The 
Irish Government will have 75% of the voting rights of AIB and 25% of the voting rights 
for appointments of the directors or directors on the board for AIB and BOI (“Bank 
Recapitalisation Plan”, 2008).
The nationalizations and mergers leading to the Irish two-pillar system also creates 
a moral hazard question. Blanket guarantees are the kindle to a moral hazard fire, moral 
hazard is created when there are no consequences and a blanket guarantee eliminates con-
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sequences. On its face then, it is unclear why Ireland would take the chance of encourag-
ing moral hazard but it was unavoidable in this instance. As stated earlier, the guarantee 
was in response to a fear of contagion throughout the banking and financial system and 
that was seen as more important than discouraging moral hazard.
In the end Ireland used two stages to manage the crisis- first public policies to sta-
bilize the banks, second restructuring loans held by firms and households (Schoenmaker, 
2015). The recapitalizations, restructuring and mergers completed stage one and with 
the leverage created through recapitalization, the Irish government was able to include a 
number of policies in restructuring that helps firms and households. Additionally, Ireland 
appears to have avoided the worst aspects of moral hazard; primarily through two steps—
attaching many strings to the bailout and lots of government oversight.
Recapitalized banks were required to provide an additional 10% capacity for lending 
to small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and an additional 30% capacity for lend-
ing to first time homebuyers at competitive rates in 2009 (“Bank Recapitalisation Plan”, 
2008). This is important because 99.8% of all enterprises in Ireland are SMEs and 70% of 
private sector employment is provided by SMEs (McDonald & Tyrrell, 2013). Providing 
an additional 10% lending capacity for SMEs opens an enormous amount of credit to the 
aspect of the economy that will provide the largest opportunity for economic recovery. 
SMEs are the backbone of all economic recovery, especially in Ireland where so much 
of the economy is composed of them. In financial panics and banking crisis, credit for 
expansion of a business is nearly impossible to come by. If banks are concerned about 
their ability to cover their liabilities and nonperforming loans are the root of the problem, 
a bank is unlikely to be encouraged to continue lending at all much less increase lending 
capabilities. The Irish government had an eye on economic recovery and not just weath-
ering the storm.
On that same note, requiring an additional 30% capacity for new homebuyers 
encourages economic growth. First time homebuyers are typically people with a high 
need to spend and a healthy income. First time homebuyers feature a lot of people in 
their late 20s, early 30s with steady jobs; they are the bread and butter of the economy. 
Again, mortgages were a major cause of the banking crisis but instead of allowing Irish 
banks to cut down their mortgage business, the government is requiring them to expand. 
The government is focused on improving the daily life of the Irish people, instead of 
what the bankers want, and that allows them to push for growth.
This is not to say that SMEs did not feel the effects of a near financial collapse, 
because SMEs make up such a large portion of Ireland’s economy there is no way that 
SMEs didn’t also suffer major losses or have been saddled with large amounts of debt. To 
this end the Irish government proposed “Examinership Lite” in late 2012 to make it eas-
ier for SMEs to restructure their debts (McDonald &Tyrrell, 2013). Ireland went into the 
banks and restructured their debt from above; allowing legislation for SMEs to restructure 
their debts only makes sense. Additionally, NAMA’s restrictions to only large commercial 
loans have burdened many SMEs with their inability to restructure a number of their 
loans. Passing “examinership lite” would afford SMEs the same treatment afforded to 
large banks. 
The Department of Finance also created the Strategic Banking Corporation of 
Ireland to lend to SMEs via banks on longer and more favorable terms than currently 
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available (Schoenmaker, 2015). It has €800 million to lend. This is another way Ireland 
is ensuring that SMEs would have funding to continue growing the economy. There 
were a few other government entities created to encourage growth and development. 
The National Pension Reserve Fund is being re-oriented from a long-term pension fund 
to a domestically focused investment fund, Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF), to 
support economic activity and employment. It begins with valuations of €6.8 billion 
(Schoenmaker, 2015).
The Irish government also included protections for the Irish people, including 
requiring banks to wait at least six months from first arrears to the enforcement of any 
legal action on repossession of a person’s primary residence (“Bank Recapitalisation 
Plan”, 2008). This allows a grace period for Irish homeowners instead of an immediate 
repossession. This is not a necessary provision, in fact it could be argued that it makes 
a banks ability to recover losses more difficult, but this speaks to who the Irish govern-
ment was concerned with while they were restructuring the banks and creating policies 
in response to the crisis. The Irish government was concerned with the Irish people and 
homeowners and went out of their way to provide some bits of protection.
The Irish government then required banks to commit themselves to a number of 
items that don’t inherently matter to Irish bankers but may be very important to the Irish 
people. They are committed to “broaden the provision of basic or introductory bank 
accounts and will promote these accounts to socio-economic groups where the holding 
of bank accounts is less prevalent and to those who find that a current account does not 
suit their basic banking needs” (“Bank Recapitalisation Plan”, 2008 p.5). This is a com-
mitment to serving the non-banking or under banked populations. This may seem in the 
clear interests of the bankers because it would increase their customer base, but for people 
who are under banked or nonbanking having banks restructure basic accounts to serve 
their needs is invaluable. In addition, banks will provide funding “to support and develop 
financial education for consumers and potential consumers” (“Bank Recapitalisation 
Plan”, 2008 p.5). They also enacted personal insolvency reforms in late 2012, including a 
shortening of the discharge period for bankruptcy from 12 years to 3 years (Schoenmaker, 
2015).
Banks will also introduce a €100 million fund to support environment friendly 
investments with an aim to reduce energy usage, switch to renewable energies and reduce 
Ireland’s carbon footprint (“Bank Recapitalisation Plan”, 2008). This is clearly positive 
for the environment, banks are now creating a large incentive for developments in envi-
ronmental technology but this is also a growth sector for the economy and therefore will 
be beneficial to the banks as well. Environmental technology is a growth sector that is 
typically lacking in funding so forcing banks to invest in it will decrease the likelihood 
that the industry will suffer from lack of funding in the future.
To avoid a crisis like this one happening again the Central Bank of Ireland (CBoI) 
proposed more stringent lending requirements to both domestic banks and foreign-
owned banks operating in Ireland (Schoenmaker, 2015). CBoI proposed to restrict lend-
ing for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent loan to value (LTV) to 15 percent 
of aggregate value of the flow of all housing loans for primary domestic house (PDH) 
purposes; a lower threshold is proposed for bought to loan (BTL) mortgages- limit BTL 
loans above 70 percent LTV to 10 percent of all BTL loans (Schoenmaker, 2015). These 
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requirements would decrease the possibility of one sector of loans, property and mortgage 
loans, from destroying the banking sector again. By limiting the proportion on banks’ 
balance sheets, they will limit the potential exposure these banks will face in the future; 
again this is the Irish Government setting itself up for success.
Ireland’s success, while impressive, does not provide a universal map for recovery. 
The largest recommendation and implication for others is that the first step in crafting 
Ireland’s, or any response, must be discovering the underlying cause of the crisis and let-
ting that dictate the response. As the banks were the root cause of Ireland’s crisis, the 
response needed to focus on the banks. This will not always be the case in future crises 
and if other countries hope to have the same success that Ireland has, they will also need 
to understand the root cause.
The other major implications from this crisis are that bad asset management agencies 
(like NAMA) are essential to a speedy recovery, everyday citizens must be catered to and, 
that regulation is critical. NAMA-esqe agencies allow banks to realize losses sooner and 
prepare banks’ books for the future. Average citizens are the main generators of economic 
recovery; they must feel safe spending their money again. Banks receiving bailouts elimi-
nates a consequence of their bad behavior; the banks and bankers are no longer facing 
bank failure and loss of funds for essentially gambling away money. The perverse incen-
tives, without outside interference, should drive up the moral hazard problem. The out-
side interference necessary is increased regulation. By attaching strings to the bailout funds 
provided to the banks, the government and its regulatory agencies can attempt to mini-
mize the impact that the next financial crisis will have on banks and everyday citizens.
Ireland’s crisis was born from the banking sector; the Irish banks set themselves up 
for failure and dragged the government and the Irish people along with them. Therefore, 
the Irish Government focused all their energy on not allowing another crisis like this one 
to happen again. They restructured their banking and financial sector and focused on 
how the restructuring would affect SMEs and families. This focus on the main drivers of 
the economy, in addition to the unique structure of Ireland’s crisis, is why Ireland has 
been able to recover much faster/better than the other periphery countries. At the end of 
the day, Ireland’s issue was not a fiscal issue and it’s much easier to change banking regu-
lations than tax policy and culture.
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